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Hazard communication by volcanologists:
part 2 - quality standards for volcanic
hazard assessments
Richard J. Bretton1* , Joachim Gottsmann1 and Ryerson Christie2
Abstract
Contextualisation is the critical process of interactions between volcanologists and risk governance decision-makers
and specifically the tailoring of hazard assessments to ensure they are driven by the needs of decision-makers.
Quality assurance standards for the contextualisation of the analysis and communication of volcanic hazards do not
formally exist. For volcanologists this governance lacuna creates a foreseeable and avoidable managerial hazard.
This is the second of two papers that together investigate the interface between the scientific treatment of volcanic
hazards and the governance of volcanic risks. Both papers are principally concerned with issues of risk governance
and their focus is hazard communication by volcanologists at this hazard-risk interface (the interface) during periods
of volcanic unrest. In our first paper “Hazard communication by volcanologists: Part 1 - Framing the case for contextualisation
and related quality standards in volcanic hazard assessments”, (Bretton et al, J Appl. Volcanol. DOI 10.1186/
s13617-018-0077-x, 2018) we investigated the perceived qualities of more ‘socially robust’ hazard assessments and
argued that the working practices of contextualisation must be more methodical.
In this paper, we focus on the actual process of contextualisation and argue that quality assurance standards need
to be devised and adopted by volcanologists undertaking hazard assessments that are robust enough to bear legal
scrutiny. Such standards are necessary: (1) to facilitate a more structured approach to contextualisation; (2) to preserve
the core values of traditional scientific methodologies; (3) to address a working assumption that, in the absence of
effective regulation, the ‘equilibrium of contextualisation’ may be unduly influenced by the demands of decision-
makers; and (4) to mitigate the managerial risks related to volcanologists assuming responsibility for contextualisation.
Our initial literature review reveals the realities of contextualisation in the absence of effective regulation and identifies
many of the foreseeable practical challenges historically faced by volcanic hazard assessors. We investigate and
characterise these challenges in order to develop quality standards tailored for practical use. In addition, we present
new empirical data acquired from a survey of 33 experienced volcanologists, 18 of whom were selected for one-to-one
semi-structured interviews. The survey captures a snapshot of working practices and related sentiments that might
indicate whether a more structured approach to contextualisation would find favour amongst volcanologists and, if so,
what principles of contextualisation would be most acceptable. This evaluation of published evidence and new data
permits us to identify seven aspects of volcanic hazard assessments relevant to quality assurance - the methods and
status of hazard analyses, and the delivery, content, status, perception and advice content of hazard communications.
Our proposed quality standards and related proto-type code of practice together address issues of materiality,
comprehensibility, proximity and integrity. They offer the possibility of hazard assessments having greater validity and
utility in that they will be framed by reference to the sentiments and actions of their users.
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Introduction
This is the second of two related papers1 that together
investigate the interface between the scientific treatment
of volcanic hazards and the governance of volcanic risks.
Both papers are principally concerned with issues of risk
governance and their focus is hazard communication by
volcanologists at this hazard-risk interface (the interface)
during periods of volcanic unrest.
Two extremes of knowledge production can be de-
scribed and contrasted. Mode-1 products have been de-
scribed as conventional scholarly reflections that are
driven by the motivations of their producers “to get the
science right” (US/NRC 1996). Detached from both so-
cial context, and political and other values, these prod-
ucts seek to characterise and predict the natural world
‘as it is’, for a separate, sequential, downstream political
management response. By contrast, Mode-2 products
are driven by the requirements of their users and strive
“to get the right science”. Their production and applica-
tion take place through co-evolutionary processes of
open dialogue between producers and users and hence
these processes can be said to be processes through
which the science and ultimately the actions resulting
from that science are ensured to be appropriate for the
social context in which they take place. This contextual-
isation involves methodical changes of not only
scientific-knowledge outputs and outcomes (i.e. pro-
cesses of communication), but also scientific-knowledge
production itself.
The trial of six scientists and a government decision-
maker for involuntary manslaughter following the
L’Aquila earthquake highlights the practical realities of
contextualisation, the influence of multiple cultural, pol-
itical, social and scientific factors before, during and
after the disaster, and the complexities of risk govern-
ance regimes involving government entities at national,
regional and local levels (Alexander 2010, 2013, 2014a,
2014b; Gabrielli and Di Brucci 2014). We hypothesise
that this trial identified a failure of contextualisation, as
we have defined above and in our first paper, and we
argue that, to improve hazard communication at the
interface, volcanologists need to adopt an approach that
openly embraces the benefits and confronts the chal-
lenges of contextualisation.
In our first paper, we argued that the working prac-
tices of contextualisation must be more methodical and
should strive to be open, transparent and fully articu-
lated. Contextualisation that meets proposed quality as-
surance standards will enhance hazard assessments and,
thereby, the utility of their outputs and outcomes. That
utility should be framed and reviewed by reference to
the sentiments and informed actions of decision-makers.
In this paper, the focus is directed away from the per-
ceived qualities of more ‘socially robust’ hazard
assessments towards the actual process of contextualisa-
tion itself. The four quality assurance standards that
were advocated in our first paper are summarised in
Table 1. In this paper, we investigate: (1) whether these
four standards reflect the sentiments of practitioners at
the interface: and (2) whether they can be deployed to
address practical challenges. Although our focus is on
volcanic risks, this approach could be applied equally to
communications about other natural hazards.
Methods
Assumptions and terminology
This investigation principally concerns volcanologists in
their role as volcanic hazard assessors and some of its
findings are based upon data derived from them. We
accept that we could have approached the same research
issues by analysing data from decision makers acting in
their capacity as stakeholders using scientific assess-
ments. The decision to acquire data only from volcanol-
ogists was based upon two working hypotheses.
Firstly, while accepting evidence that a degree of infor-
mal contextualisation of hazard assessments is becoming
more commonplace (e.g. Mayberry 2016; Potter et al.
2014; Jolly and Cronin 2014) we adopt as a working as-
sumption that, in many regions with volcanic hazards, it is
not common practice for volcanic hazard assessments to
be ‘contextualised’ by any formal, methodical, documented
or auditable process. Secondly, we hypothesise that the
pre-communication expectations of decision-makers
(i.e. in terms of the timing, scope, depth and format of in-
formation provision) are dynamic, neither unique nor uni-
versal and therefore, with limited research resources, less
would be gained by investigating and attempting to char-
acterise them at a single moment in time.
The risk governance terminology used within this paper
is defined in Table 1 of our first paper and, we have deliber-
ately avoided use of the expression “end-users” to describe
decision-makers receiving science-based services. Given
Table 1 Four quality assurance standards for the processes of
contextualising volcanic hazard assessments
Standard
(the first three from
Fischhoff 2013)
Purpose
Materiality To promote the paramount status of users’ needs,
which may reflect competing demands related to
the speed, scope and precision of scientific advice
required.
Proximity To promote effective user-access to scientific
advice in both time and space.
Comprehensibility To ensure users can readily extract sufficient meaning
from scientific advice.
Integrity To nurture the willingness of users to receive and
trust scientific advice and make informed decisions
based upon the quality of existing relationships.
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that we argue in favour of the planned and integrated con-
textualisation of services throughout the processes of their
production and delivery, we see the term “end-users” as in-
adequate. Alternative expressions, such as “collaborators”,
“co-producers” and “partners”, have other weaknesses. We
also assume that, in most countries, the usual role of volca-
nologists is not to lead risk governance efforts, but instead
to undertake hazard assessments, to contribute hazard
knowledge and, if requested, related advice.
Literature review and survey design/content
A literature review was first undertaken to find historical
published evidence of interface challenges.
Secondly, a survey (Additional file 1) targeted a cohort
of 33 volcanologists (Additional file 2) with experience
of hazard assessments derived from involvement with
volcano observatories and/or relevant academic re-
search. A minimum degree of anonymity was guaranteed
by ensuring that specific responses could not be linked
to identifiable individuals. Each participant has been
given an identifying number and further gender, age and
nationality details are summarised in Additional file 2.
The aim of the survey was: (1) to capture a
post-L’Aquila snapshot of working practices for hazard
assessments and related sentiments; and (2) to reflect a
range of ages, experience, hazard settings and cultures.
We argue that the current practices and sentiments of
the interviewees, who included many of the world’s most
influential leaders in the science of volcanoes, may indi-
cate whether a more structured approach to contextual-
isation would find favour amongst volcanologists and, if
so, what principles of contextualisation would be most
acceptable. It is not suggested that the cohort was either
big enough or sufficiently representative to enable as-
sumptions to be made about results that might have
been elicited from a bigger, different or more diverse co-
hort. It is accepted that the data may have an unin-
tended Anglo-Saxon, Anglo-USA and/or Northern
Hemisphere bias. In the absence of a larger or different
cohort of participants, it is not possible to assess the na-
ture, extent and implications of this possible bias. A fu-
ture survey of volcanologists practising in, inter alia,
Iceland, South-East Asia, Latin and South America, New
Zealand, Japan and Africa would provide helpful com-
plementary data.
The questions in the survey were drafted after, and
based upon, our literature review, which revealed evi-
dence that the interface is “treacherous” because “strong
tensions arise”, and “a neat demarcation between scien-
tific evidence, societal values and beliefs, economic con-
siderations and policy-decisions is not always easy”
(OECD 2015, 13). This led in turn to the identification
of the main components of hazard assessment and sev-
eral commonly used value statements. It is not possible
to attribute the genesis of each value statement to a de-
finitive source. The sources referred to in Additional file 3
are acknowledged in respect to certain key values.
The main substantive questions considered in this
study adopted the same general format, which was:
You will find below a list of possible characteristics of
the [methods] of volcanic hazard assessment [processes].
Please indicate the extent to which you consider them to
be important for the effective fulfilment of your usual
hazard/assessment/risk management role
(Additional file 1, questions 24, 27, 30, 36, 39, 46).
The words in square brackets changed,
question-by-question, to redirect the focus from say,
methods of analysis, to the status of analysis, to the de-
livery/content/status/perception of communications or
to the advice content of communications.
Since one of our goals was to measure the relative im-
portance that hazard assessors attached to several related
value statements about a common research dimension
(for example values related to hazard communications)
the survey used Likert scale questions (Bryman 2012).
For the substantive value statements in Questions 24,
27, 30, 33, 36 and 39 (considered in Tables 4 and 5), a
6-point range was used, the points being Irrelevant
(scored − 1), Unsure (scored 0), Relevant – Slightly im-
portant (scored 1), Relevant – Important (scored 2),
Relevant- Highly important (scored 3) and Critical
(scored 4). For the statements involving the forms of ad-
vice/guidance that may accompany hazard communica-
tions in Question 46 (considered in Table 7), a 5-point
range was used, the points being Never provide (scored
− 1), Unsure (scored 0), Sometimes provide (scored 1),
Routinely provide (scored 2) and Always provide (scored
3). It was not assumed that all the participants perceived
the interval between each point in the same way.
A quantitative analysis of the scores was undertaken to
produce an approximate ranking of all related value
statements. In Tables 4 and 5, the values have been
ranked from highest (most important) to lowest (least
important) based on the percentage of the maximum
score (i.e. number of participants for each question
times a maximum score of 4). The working assumption
that is derived from the answers is that they give an indi-
cation of the relative importance attached to each value
statement by the participating cohort of volcanologists.
In Table 7, the forms of advice/guidance have been
ranked from most common (always) to least common
(sometimes) based on the percentage of the maximum
score (i.e. number of participants for each question
times a maximum score of 3).
For each value/form of advice, a median narrative is
also provided. Although cardinal standard deviations
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were calculated, they are not set out here because it is
accepted they are not of any statistical significance given
the small number of survey participants.
Interviews
Eighteen one-to-one semi-structured interviews with ex-
perienced volcanologists were conducted by the first au-
thor over a period of 8 months beginning in July 2014.2
Although the principal purpose of each interview was to
complete the survey, which was used as an interview
agenda to provide structure, the interviewees were en-
couraged, by both open and closed questions, to talk
freely and in greater detail around the issues raised in
the survey (Bryman 2012). The interviewees, all of
whom spoke fluent English, were handed an Ethical
Agreement (Additional file 4) that was signed by the first
author. No interview requests were declined, and all in-
terviews were recorded by express consent and later
transcribed for detailed qualitative analysis. The inter-
views averaged 1 h 17 min in duration (shortest 38 min;
longest 2 h 6 min).
The data derived from the interviews, other than the
scored statements referred to above, were subjected to
two forms of qualitative analysis – ‘grounded theory’
(Glaser and Strauss 1967, Strauss and Corbin 1998;
Bryman 2012) and ‘thematic analysis’ (Bryman 2012).
An approach based upon grounded theory was adopted
because we neither had, nor wished to use, preconceived,
‘fixed’ (i.e. standardised) codes “to label, separate, compile
and organise data” (Charmaz 1983, 186). It is accepted
that the layout and content of the survey provided a
considerable degree of initial coding. The data collection
(by means of the survey and interviews) and analysis pro-
ceeded in parallel. Evolving conceptual ideas and substan-
tive theoretical arguments were developed out of the data,
through an iterative approach. Within the thematic ana-
lysis, examples of initial/open coding and selective/fo-
cussed coding including axial coding were identified
(Strauss and Corbin 1990; Charmaz 2006).
Background – Historical evidence of interface
challenges
It is necessary to identify and characterise carefully the
foreseeable practical realities faced by scientists engaged
at the interface in order to help develop the more struc-
tured contextualisation that we advocate as being neces-
sary. A literature review of published work was
undertaken to find evidence of challenges faced at the
interface and this revealed a rich discourse that includes
some general warnings and identifies many difficulties
that require further detailed consideration. Commenta-
tors, however, have thus far failed to identify common
themes, and possible underlying causal trends, that
might form the basis for the development of practical
solutions that can be developed and tested for utility by
further research.
The interface is treacherous (OECD 2015) having been
described as the “science-management” interface (Jolly
and Cronin 2014) delineating the demarcation between
the ‘factual’ world of knowledge and understanding, and
the ‘normative’ world of value. The separation of these
two worlds, which clearly and inevitably interact within
risk governance, is increasingly problematic, a naïve
oversimplification, murky3 and somewhat contrived
(Horlick-Jones 1998; Stirling 2007; Renn 2008; Donovan
and Oppenheimer 20124; OECD 2015). The interface
can create stress and friction, and become “critical and
contentious” (Aspinall and Cooke 1998; Newhall et al.
1999, 2000; Metzger et al. 1999; Solana et al. 2008; Renn
20085; Macrae 2011; Potter et al. 2014; Pierson et al.
2014; Neuberg 2015).
The role of volcanologists at the interface appears to
be poorly defined (being divisive, blurred, and porous
and confused) provoking debate involving a wide range
of academics and commentators from both general sci-
entific and geo-scientific backgrounds (Peterson 1996;
Nowotny 2003; Renn 2008; Ronan et al. 2000; Stirling
2010; Donovan and Oppenheimer 2012, Marzocchi et al.
2012; Donovan and Oppenheimer 20146; Bretton et al.
2015; OECD 20157).
Our review highlights several themes involving roles,
uncertainties, changes and difficulties, which we sum-
marise in Table 2.
Demands and pressures upon volcanologists at the
interface not only create anxieties and emotional re-
sponses, but also influence their behaviour and deci-
sions. On closer investigation of the evidence presented,
and the sources listed in Additional file 3, the practical
realities can be identified from, and are reflected in, the
types of behaviour summarised in Table 3.
Although it is not suggested that Table 3 contains a
comprehensive list of interface issues, we argue that: (1)
it presents a realistic characterisation of the realities of
hazard assessments; and (2) it identifies many of the
foreseeable practical challenges faced by volcanic hazard
assessors. The list can therefore be used to begin the
identification and characterisation of some of the com-
plex realities that quality standards for contextualisation
may need to consider and attempt to mitigate.
We refer to the ‘equilibrium of contextualisation’ in-
troduced in our first paper and the effect that ‘stake-
holder pressures’ have upon it. Adopting Rothstein’s
model (Rothstein et al. 2006), we argued that contextual-
isation is in ‘equilibrium’ when there is ‘balance’ between
the influences of quality standards (regulation), natural
and operational constraints (reality) and stakeholder
pressures (deregulation). Balance is achieved when regu-
latory sources are effective, quality standards are
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unequivocal and enforced, within natural and oper-
ational constraints stakeholder pressures are addressed,
and structured contextualisation preserves scientific
methodologies and probity.
The nine items listed in Table 3 represent evidence of
actual and potential behaviour consistent with ‘stake-
holder’ influences and/or some degree of informal and un-
structured contextualisation. Careful characterisation of
these items is important, if quality standards to safeguard
values attributed to traditional scientific methodologies
are going to be proposed. The first eight items in Table 3
may infringe the advocated standard of integrity. Item 9
(communications that do not respond to the needs and
expectations of risk-mitigation decisions-makers) may
breach Fischhoff ’s standards of materiality, comprehensi-
bility and proximity (Fischhoff 2013).
This paper adopts the figure we used in our first paper
which is reproduced here as Fig. 1. As illustrated in Fig. 1,
the behaviour in Table 3 may create disequilibrium and
imbalance, and thereby increase the possibility of a dimin-
ution in traditional standards of scientific probity.
Survey of current practices and sentiments at the
interface
For the sake of clarity, the functions of ‘scientific ana-
lysis’, ‘scientific communication’ and ‘scope of scientific
advice’ are addressed separately under sub-headings and,
for the sake of brevity, lengthy verbatim quotes from in-
terviewees are contained within end-notes.
Scientific analysis
Two questions focussed upon the analytical function
undertaken by volcanologists when assessing volcanic
hazards. One question (question 27) addressed the ‘sta-
tus’ or ‘nature’ of some of the measurable characteristics
of that function; the other (question 24) the ‘methods’.
Table 4 sets out the wording of the values used within
the relevant questions and the words in bold are adopted
hereinafter for ease of reference. This general format is
also adopted in Tables 5 and 7.
Within this section, more detailed reference will only
be made to those values that: (1) are of particular rele-
vance to our consideration of quality standards for con-
textualisation; or (2) may provide evidence that
analytical processes are undergoing changes that may
lead to better hazard assessments in the future and add-
itional scope for contextualisation.
The critical role of monitoring data was recorded, and
interviewees stated the importance of acquiring histor-
ical and benchmarking data over lengthy periods and
fully and carefully characterising past events. Several in-
terviewees highlighted the values of multi-disciplinary
contributions, systematic analysis and deliberation. In
the context of more systematic approaches to analysis,
six interviewees (Ints. 3, 4 12, 15, 19, 24) described an
emerging debate about: (a) the nature of and the role for
subjective judgements/contributions; (b) the utility, if
any, of ‘doppelganger’ and ‘analogue’ studies; (c) the
transferability of experience between hazards with differ-
ent magma compositions; (d) the benefits, if any, of
gravity, geo-magnetic and ‘real-time’ geo-chemical and
petrological data; and (e) the use of bespoke research,
computer models, community/local sources of know-
ledge and global data resources.
A link was established by two interviewees (Ints. 7, 19)
between ‘open and transparent’ analytical processes and
‘balanced’, ‘written’ communications capable of building
‘confidence/trust’. To support this view, the rankings for
the scores for these four values were very similar and
relatively high, being respectively 78, 78, 82 and 81.
Table 3 Behaviour reflecting assessments influenced by factors
not strictly confined to, or derived from, evidence-based scientific
analysis of volcanic hazards, and detrimental to quality standards
of integrity, materiality, comprehensibility and proximity
Behaviour detrimental to a quality standard of integrity
(1) Characterisations that:
(a) are not the product of scientific rigour and good practice;
(b) are more complete or certain than justified by the available
data;
(c) do not reflect openly levels of significant scientific
disagreement; or
(d) reflect psychological, personal and other subjective factors.
(2) Consideration of:
(a) societal issues such as population/valued asset exposures and
vulnerabilities and thereby risk-related consequences;
(b) political, economic, local, or environmental values; or
(c) commercial, ideological, religious or local sentiments and
pressures.
(3) Advocating, favouring, encouraging or refuting the views of other
stakeholders on non-scientific matters.
(4) Consideration and/or choice of risk-mitigation options such as risk
alert levels.
(5) Actions intended not only to inform non-scientific/risk-mitigation
decisions but also to influence, directly or indirectly, their nature
and/or timing.
(6) Actions that may represent breaches of duties of care owed in
criminal and civil law.
(7) Blurring of functional risk governance roles involving scientific hazard
analysis and risk-mitigation decisions and/or the assumption by
volcanologists of another stakeholder’s duty to make risk-mitigation
decisions.
(8) Precautionary, defensive, conservative or blame-related bias related
to perceived ‘managerial’ risks as opposed to ‘societal’ risks.
Behaviour detrimental to quality standards of materiality, comprehensibility
and proximity
(9) Communications that do not respond to the needs and
expectations of risk-mitigation decision-makers.
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Scientific communication
Four questions (questions 30, 33, 36 and 39) focussed
upon the nature, perception, delivery and content of com-
munications made by volcanologists to decision-makers.
These questions were relevant to all four of our proposed
quality standards.
Several interviewees said that the survey’s status values
relating to issues of integrity were in reality a list of
‘ideals’. In the words of one (Int. 4), they are “very hard
to achieve in practice and [equally] difficult to demon-
strate…These are all very high standards to really
achieve. I mean these are aspirations.” One interviewee
(Int. 19) prefaced their commentary on these character-
istics by implying that these were matters upon which
the recipients of hazard communications, and not the
providers thereof, should comment. All these matters
were relevant because each one had to be ‘considered’ by
the provider scientists and thereafter discussed with
recipient stakeholders. From their own personal experi-
ence, “There is very little discussion with the consumer
about what they want”. Another (Int. 3) said, “It all de-
pends on the user”. Another respondent (Int. 11) stated
that their scores reflected their belief that “We need to
keep it simple and clear. Too much detail on some as-
pects of the information can be a bad thing, as it might
introduce confusion.” Table 6 contains a summary of
comments about the nature, delivery and perception of
communications made by volcanologists to stakeholders
insofar as these are relevant to quality standards for
contextualisation.
Scientific communication (advice scope)
One survey question (question 46) investigated the range
of advice and guidance provided by volcanologists dur-
ing periods of emerging volcanic unrest. This question
was relevant to, and complements, the historical evi-
dence of a treacherous interface and the possibility that
the distinction between advisory and decision-making
functions might become blurred. All the values in this
question, which are detailed in Table 7, related to our
proposed materiality quality standard.
Interviewee 27 prefaced all answers by stating that the
nature and extent of the advice that accompanies hazard
communications was “culture dependent”, particularly in
Fig. 1 Contextualisation in Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
Key: Examples of possible influences, constraints and pressures are given; Hazard Assessments (HA); Decision-makers (DM); Contextualisation is in
‘equilibrium’ when there is ‘balance’ between the influences of quality standards (regulation), natural and operational constraints (reality) and
stakeholder pressures (deregulation). Balance is achieved when regulatory sources are effective, quality standards are unequivocal and enforced,
within natural and operational constraints stakeholder pressures are addressed, and structured contextualisation preserves scientific
methodologies and probity. Disequilibrium and imbalance may result when regulatory sources are ineffective, quality standards are equivocal or
unenforced, within natural and operational constraints stakeholder pressures are not addressed, and ad hoc contextualisation fails to preserve
traditional standards of scientific probity (Reproduced from Bretton et al. 2018)
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relation to risk alert levels. Another (Int. 28) wished to
emphasise the importance of long-term monitoring,
even if it is only through a basic skeletal system. In
addition to providing “absolutely vital” threshold data,
such ongoing monitoring may also help to familiarise
at-risk communities regarding hazards in a routine way
and thus enable them to understand the significance of
minor earthquakes and other evidence of possible unrest.
Interviewee 1 did not like ‘status of volcano level’
systems, believing them to be dangerous because spatial,
temporal and intensity parameters cannot be pigeon-
holed. They did not like knowing that risk levels and risk
mitigation strategies might be linked automatically to
hazard levels. “I really don’t like [volcano status level]
systems because they are implicitly risk level [systems].
The other problem is [that] with volcanoes if you go
through their status level, volcanoes often go very quiet
just before they explode. They lock up. Seismicity drops,
gas drops….” (Int. 1).
Issues of experience and training were raised. One
interviewee thought that the provision of hazard mitiga-
tion advice depended upon the relative experience levels
of the hazard and risk assessors. “I think advice should
be offered…even when those who have to implement it
may not have thought there is a possibility [of mitiga-
tion].” The same interviewee made the same point in re-
lation to risk mitigation advice. “If you have the
experience, you should provide it if you can, but the
point is, if you don’t do it, I don’t think you should be
found wanting…I would steer clear of [the giving of risk
mitigation advice] most of the time… because [if you
give it] you take responsibility for it.” Interviewee 27
expressed a complementary view saying that all advice
must be sound and within the bounds of the adviser’s
“mandate and expertise”.
Interviewee 11 volunteered “[m]y scores reflect my train-
ing…We work on hazards, not risk. Risk is the domain of
other organisations we work with, so we should leave that
to the experts…until that becomes something we work on
ourselves.” This response directly raised the issue of the ex-
istence and nature of the interface and the way in which
this interface determines roles and vice versa.
Discussion of current practices and sentiments at
the interface
The results presented in the last section are now dis-
cussed with reference to our proposed quality standards.
Quality standard - integrity
Many of the results are directly relevant to this proposed
standard which goes to the very heart of the way in
which the analysis of volcanic hazards is undertaken. Al-
though current methodologies and processes of analysis
are often neither structured nor recorded in a formal
way (i.e. they are not ‘protocolised’ and remain largely
undocumented), there is clearly a high degree of
Table 4 Value statements relating to the analysis of volcanic hazards
Value statement Ranking /42 % Max score Median narrative
Evidence (analysis based upon monitoring data for the volcano being assessed) 6 88 Critical
Multidiscipline (analysis based upon a wide range of scientific disciplines e.g. geophysics,
geochemistry, geodetics etc.)
9 85 Critical
Analytical, systematic and rational process 12 84 Critical
Deliberation (analysis based upon the collective interdisciplinary consideration of several
expert views)
13 83 Very imp.
Defensible process 19 80 Very imp.
Documented process 24 78 Very imp.
Open and Transparent process 26 78 Very imp.
Experience (analysis based upon expertise derived from knowledge of many volcanoes
including possible doppelgangers)
27 77 Very imp.
Planned and Auditable process 31 67 Very imp.
Reproducible process 32 66 Very imp.
Expert elicitation (analysis based upon pooled expert advice derived from some form of
formal expert elicitation)
33 65 Very imp.
Quality assured/audited process 37 53 Important
Probabilistic tools (analysis using tools such as BET_EF, HASSET, QVAST etc.a) 39 53 Important
Scoring and ranking regimes: A 6-point range was used, the points being Irrelevant (scored −1), Unsure (scored 0), Relevant – Slightly important (scored 1),
Relevant – Important (scored 2), Relevant- Highly important (scored 3) and Critical (scored 4). The survey’s 42 values relating to analysis and communication have
been ranked in the table from highest (most important) to lowest (least important) based on the percentage of the maximum score (i.e. number of participants
for each question times a maximum score of 4). Rankings not shown in this table are in Table 5 because they relate to communication rather than analysis. For
each value, a median narrative is also provided
aSandri et al. 2009; Sobradelo et al. 2014; Bartolini et al. 2013
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Table 5 Values related to the nature, perception, delivery and content of communications
Value statement Ranking /42 % Max score Median Narrative Standard
Timely delivery (reflecting the dynamic demands of the situation) 1 92 Critical Prox.
Independent (free from duress and uninfluenced by the pressures of all
affected and interested parties)
2 91 Critical Integ.
Free from the influence of commercial interests 3 91 Critical Integ.
Non-political 4 90 Critical Integ.
Honest and candid (even if worrisome) 5 89 Critical Integ.
Neutral/Unbiased (free from institutional systemic bias, which tends to
encourage particular outcomes, and not advocating, encouraging or
refuting any stakeholder view/risk management action)
7 86 Critical Integ.
Delivered from one authorised source (to avoid mixed scientific messages) 8 86 Critical Prox.
Free from the influence of ideological and religious interests 10 85 Critical Integ.
Recipient centric - “User-friendly” (directed to the identified
needs/wishes/uses of the recipients and to enable them to make
“informed” choices)
11 84 Critical Mat.
Written 14 82 Critical Prox.
Likelihood (probability of onset of defined scenario) Clarity 15 82 Critical Comp.
Understandable/unambiguous terminology
(geological, chemical, scientific and qualitative terms)
16 82 Critical Comp.
Confidence/Trust building 17 81 Critical Integ.
Outcome/Output centric (relevant to subsequent risk management
processes and decisions)
18 80 Critical Mat.
Value-free (unaffected by societal context e.g. knowledge of societal
exposures and vulnerabilities)
20 79 Very imp. Integ.
Objective (removing as much subjectivity as possible) 21 79 Very imp. Integ.
Authoritative 22 79 Very imp. Integ.
Balanced (reflecting unknowns, uncertainties and the range of
differing expert views)
23 78 Very imp. Integ.
Reflecting current scientific “Good Practice” 27 76 Very imp. Integ.
Assumptions, limitations, time/cost constraints, etc. Clarity 28 75 Very imp. Comp.
Confidence (variability due to limited/lack of knowledge, etc. reflected
in the width of the 95% confidence interval) in Likelihood Clarity
29 72 Very imp. Comp.
Graphics (such as pie charts, histograms, event trees, etc.) to
illustrate/support narrative
30 67 Very imp. Comp.
Likelihood Expression in qualitative terms (e.g. “likely”) as well
as quantitative terms (65%)
34 58 Important Comp.
Tweets, public internet status alerts, etc. 35 54 Important Prox.
Peer reviewed (to the extent possible given the dynamics
of the situation)
36 53 Important Integ.
Confidence Precision 38 53 Important Comp.
Confidence Expression in qualitative terms
(e.g. “high/medium/low confidence”) or a probability range
(e.g. 65–75%) reflecting the width of the confidence interval
40 51 Important Comp.
Likelihood Precision 41 48 Important Comp.
Provider centric (directed to the needs/wishes of the hazard assessors) 42 28 Important Comp.
Scoring and ranking regimes: A 6-point range was used, the points being Irrelevant (scored −1), Unsure (scored 0), Relevant – Slightly important (scored 1), Relevant – Important
(scored 2), Relevant- Highly important (scored 3) and Critical (scored 4). The survey’s 42 values relating to analysis and communication have been ranked in the table from
highest (most important) to lowest (least important) based on the percentage of the maximum score (i.e. number of participants for each question times a maximum score of
4). Rankings not shown in this table are in Table 4 because they relate to analysis rather than communication. For each value, a median narrative is also provided
Values related to the proposed integrity standard (Integ.) are in shaded rows
Abbreviations: Median narrative – Very important (Very imp.); Quality standards - Proximity (Prox.), Integrity (Integ.), Materiality (Mat.) and Comprehensibility (Comp.)
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Table 6 A summary of comments about the nature, perception, and delivery of communications made by volcanologists to
end-users relevant to quality standards for contextualisation
Value Summary of comments (interviewee reference)
Independent, neutral,
objective
These are wonderful ideals/aspirations worthy of pursuit. They are difficult to achieve in practice and demonstrate objectively
(4, 15, 27).
They can easily be lost by individuals being ‘welded’ by training and/or practice to certain conceptual or theoretical models (15).
Expert elicitation processes can assist objectivity “because the big cheeses cannot just override the other people who might
have very good arguments” (15)
Neutral, Value-free,
Recipient/Outcome
centric
There are occasions when value free neutrality is not possible and appropriate, and it is better to nuance volcano level
changes to produce an apparent gradual escalation of unrest with the objective of assisting risk managers and preventing
unnecessary public alarm (28).
Societal context should not influence hazard analysis at all (12, 17).
If analytical processes are always constrained by time, resources etc., they should be focussed on selected areas based upon
any acquired knowledge of ‘exposure’ and ‘vulnerability’ risk variables (12, 19, 24)
Analytical processes cannot ignore context as scientists must be realistic and recipient-focussed. Scientists must act in a way
that helps risk decision makers make informed decisions (3).
A hazard assessment merely starts a conversation with other stakeholders (19).
Commercial, ideological and religious interests cannot be ignored if scientists are to be truly recipient focussed (24).
“You can’t ignore them [commercial interests] nor can you…completely detach from the political system in which you’re
operating because…there are going to be political realities which constrain what you can do and… there are going to be
practical compromises one comes to because otherwise your advice is going to get ignored so you can’t afford to be too
prissy” (4).
Balance It is important to record and communicate not only the view of the majority but also the opinions of dissenters (15, 28).
Understandable Communications must be recipient focussed, in content and form, and respectful of distinct cultural/community contexts
(1, 10, 19)
Good practice This issue is not straightforward because it raises the complex issue of quality - in particular, values and thresholds for
practice quality and practitioner competence.
Views were expressed that quality of practice is: (1) context dependent; (2) dynamic, as it evolves as a function of time;
(3) linked to the values of openness and transparency; and (4) related to stakeholder trust.
Peer review Obvious practical difficulties arise during emergencies, but PR would be more practical if one separated the information
being used (the data, analysis, models, etc.) from the advice-giving process itself.
It is important to differentiate between supplementing the expertise/experience of one group of advisers by the informal
means of using external competent resources (e.g. a review or second opinion by email or by phone) and true formal PR
by independent anonymous reviewers (4).
Provider centric Recipients are annoyed by words in communications that are included merely “to cover” the scientists providing analysis (24).
At worst this approach is “this is my programme [meaning in this context analysis], this is what it produces, take it or leave it” (1)
Confidence/Trust
building
Trust must be built and, once built, you don’t need to worry about it. It can be built by listening to, and working closely with,
interested communities and, in particular, commercial and religious stakeholders (24).
It comes from ‘dialogue’ and it is important to have direct communication with religious, commercial and political communities
about what ‘impartial’ scientific analysis meant “in their context” (24).
Trust may be linked to ‘independence’. “Independence from…local government is absolutely critical because…[it] is related
to trust…If the scientists are increasingly seen as an instrument of government, the trust they have as being independent
is…dissipated” (15).
Delivery -Timely, one
source, authoritative
“I think that the legal pressure after the L’Aquila trial urged us a lot to write down best practice” (Int. 14).
Sometimes, irrevocable deadlines, which were unnecessary or unreasonable, were imposed and adhered to. Often “a degree of
flexibility” would permit something less “half-baked or incomplete” and with less “mistakes” (4)
One source is not always the correct approach. “There are a lot of people saying…there should only be one view, one
version. I think that is to underestimate the intelligence of politicians in the public eye. It avoids conflict. It avoids ambiguities
but sometimes [more than one source] can serve a purpose”. They opined that, if there are truly two differing schools of
thought, expressing them through a sole source may “not necessarily” be the correct way (1).
Written A ‘written’ communication is important for multiple reasons. The reasons that emerged were (1) to assist openness and
transparency; (2) to assist auditing; (3) to prevent misunderstandings and misquotations; and (4) to assist proof of delivery.
Graphics and scientific
terminology
The use of graphics provoked a range of views. Whilst some favoured a range of communication forms, including graphics,
most the participants accepted that much depended upon the utility attached to graphics by those who receive them.
Terminology “should be as simple and straightforward as possible. You can convey a very complex geological argument
using very simple [terms].” (12). Glossaries of the most important volcanic and scientific terms have been used successfully.
Continued and frequent use of correct geological terms is important but further relationships will assist inculcation (1).
Clarity, precision
and confidence
‘Clarity’ of expressions regarding the likelihood of hazard onset was more important than their ‘precision’. One interviewee
(Int. 9) commented, “Once it [the likelihood of hazard onset] is over the threshold, it [precision] is less important”. One interviewee
(28) referred to the fine-tuning of precision (the difference between a 65% and 67% chance of a volcanic hazard onset) and added,
“Who cares?” Another (12) stated, “Who cares. It does not matter…[fine-tuning] is meaningless. It’s easy to get bogged down in
these things.”
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consensus as to how analysis should be undertaken.
None of the values carefully selected for inclusion in the
survey was ‘irrelevant’ or less than ‘important’, and no al-
ternative or additional values emerged during the survey
and interviews despite active prompting (see survey
questions 26, 29, 32, 35, 38 and 41).
Survey participants favoured analysis based upon: (1)
the monitoring of data for the volcano being assessed;
(2) a wide range of scientific disciplines; (3) a collective
inter-disciplinary consideration of several expert views;
and (4) expertise derived from knowledge of many volca-
noes. In the context of an apparently favoured transition to
a less ad hoc and more methodical approach to contextual-
isation, we noted that, unsurprisingly, participants rated as
either ‘critical’ or ‘very important’ a systematic and rational,
defensible, documented, open and transparent process.
Current practices and sentiments may indicate
whether a more structured approach to analysis would
find favour amongst volcanologists and, if yes, what
principles of contextualisation would be most accept-
able. In this regard, survey participants clearly expressed
a continuing need to separate hazard analysis (the phys-
ical dimension of risk) from risk-related influences (the
societal and managerial dimensions). This was evidenced
by values that emphasised the need for analysis to be
non-political and free from commercial, ideological and
religious influences. The demarcation is also illustrated
by the apparent reluctance of hazard analysts to offer
Table 6 A summary of comments about the nature, perception, and delivery of communications made by volcanologists to
end-users relevant to quality standards for contextualisation (Continued)
Value Summary of comments (interviewee reference)
Expressions of likelihood are a minefield and a range of solutions was suggested. At one extreme, only numbers should be
used without any qualitative narrative. At the other extreme, all expressions (numbers and/or narrative) should be user-focussed
and any narrative expressions should be very carefully defined reflecting the different requirements of different audiences.
Sometimes locally-calibrated risk analogues are useful. Even the use of words of common usage may be challenging since
sometimes common words are used by scientists in a very narrow and technical way.
Confidence (i.e. variability due to limited/lack of knowledge, etc.) was linked by one interviewee with the qualities of
‘openness and transparency’, ‘written’ format and ‘balanced’ content. For others, this difficult concept directly impacted on
trust and, accordingly, a recipient focussed approach was needed to reflect cultural and other issues, particularly if qualitative
expressions were to be used. The reasons for doing so included: (1) to avoid giving false hope; (2) to identify issues related to
resource constraints; (3) to mitigate managerial risks by providing back coverage; (4) to build trust based upon transparency and
openness; and (5) to reflect both the quantity and quality of the available evidence.
Tweets The use of tweets and similar modes of communication provoked a wide range of observations. Some participants warned
of unintended over-reactions and consequences, and perceived difficulties of orderly coordination and recipient targeting.
Others recognised that a wide range of communication recipient-focussed methods (including highly visual methods, 3D
models and videos, and public talks) must be considered and that in some locations and cultures, but by no means all,
social media was already very important.
*The authors readily acknowledge that social media practices have greatly advanced since the survey and interviews were conducted.
Table 7 The range of advice/guidance provided by volcanologists during periods of emerging volcanic unrest
The nature of the advice/guidance given by volcanologists H/R Max % score Ranking /9 Median
narrative
‘Status of the volcano’ level (levels of hazard only) H 75 1 Always
Possible medium−/long-term evolution of the current unrest event H 75 2 Routinely
Benefits of short-term monitoring (monitoring the present by human surveillance and instruments) H 73 3 Routinely
Safety of continued ‘short-term’ monitoring (e.g. the collection of samples, the placement
or maintenance of equipment etc.)
H 60 4 Routinely
Adequacy of ‘long-term’ monitoring (understanding the past from historical data,
geology mapping etc.)
H 57 5 Routinely
Secondary hazards (e.g. drinking water aquifers being contaminated by degassing/magma;
forest fires)
H 54 6 Routinely
Possible measures to mitigate risks (managing the future) R 25 7 Sometimes
Possible measures to mitigate the spatial or physical parameters of possible hazards
(e.g. barriers, channels, retention basins, lake drainage, water spraying, re-vegetation etc.)
R 23 8 Sometimes
Risk Alert levels (levels linking the current state of the volcano to pre-determined risk mitigation actions) R 14 9 Sometimes
Scoring and ranking regimes: A 5-point range was used, the points being Never provide (scored − 1), Unsure (scored 0), Sometimes provide (scored 1), Routinely
provide (scored 2) and Always provide (scored 3). The survey’s 9 statements relating to advice have been ranked in the table from most common (always) to least
common (sometimes) based on the percentage of the maximum score (i.e. number of participants for each question times a maximum score of 3). For each form
of advice, a median narrative is also provided
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mitigation advice routinely in respect of risk and hazard
mitigation actions, and risk alert levels.
Consistent with this demarcation, the survey also
reaffirmed the significance of the ‘traditional’ qualities
of scientific independence,8 neutrality, freedom from
value, balance and objectivity, whilst also rating highly
the ‘new’ influences of purpose (i.e. recipient/outcome
focus) and objective quality (i.e. good practice). It is
noted here that these values were considered by some
of the interviewees to be no more than ideals incapable
of either demonstration or evaluation. Future research
should consider these understandable reservations and
investigate whether qualitative norms of ‘good science’
have any utility.
Some values that are relevant to integrity attracted rela-
tively low rankings. There is less support for ‘planned and
auditable’, ‘reproducible’, ‘peer-review’ and ‘quality assured/
audited’ processes which all had lower quartile rankings.
The merits and practicalities of ‘peer review’ generated
considerable debate and this may be unsurprising given
the almost total absence of academic commentary on its
role in the context of hazard assessments.9
The ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ values, referred to above, may
represent a basis for: (1) the quality assurance steps scien-
tists must take “to ensure the reproducibility of their ana-
lysis and the quality of their advice” (OECD 2015, 21); and
(2) the rules of engagement that provide the “foundation
on which scientists and risk decision-makers should base
their operations and interactions”, as advocated by the
UK’s Government Office for Science (UK/GOS 2011, 32);
and the “rigorous, replicable methods” of analysis referred
to in the 1996 US/NRC report (US/NRC 1996).10
Quality standard - materiality
There are new data to support the conclusion that we
reached in our first paper. We concluded that there is a
slow-moving paradigm shift away from a traditional lin-
ear one-way educational approach to communication to-
wards a more iterative two-way ‘outcome-focussed’
dialogue with user decision-makers. The rankings that
support this are the lowest possible ranking for ‘provider
centric’ and upper quartile rankings for ‘recipient cen-
tric’ and ‘outcome/output centric’.
There was a clear rejection of the ‘provider centric’ traits
that are inherent features of hazard assessments that initi-
ate traditional linear models of risk management. Whilst
describing the need for hazard assessments to be ‘reci-
pient-centric’, several of the interviewees described the
hallmarks of contextualisation without actually using that
word; i.e. they acknowledged the existence of the man-
agerial dimension of risk governance and a need to con-
sider the requirements of decision-makers.
Another theme, which is related to and flows from a shift
towards some degree of contextualisation, is the evolving
acceptance of the value of, and the need for, ‘deliberation’
during hazard assessments. This is evidenced by:
 the upper quartile rankings for ‘deliberation’,
‘recipient-centric’ and ‘outcome-centric’
communications;
 the middle quartile rankings of values expressly or
implicitly supporting or encouraging a two-way
dialogue with decision-makers such as openness and
transparency;
 the ranking of ‘clarity’ above ‘precision’ for
statements of likelihood (Score 82%, Ranking
of 15/42 against 48%, 41/42) and for statements
of scientific confidence (72%, 29/42 against 53%,
38/42); and
 the importance attached by some interviewees to
understanding commercial, religious and ideological
interests whilst simultaneously maintaining their
objective independence from them.
Quality standard – Comprehensibility
The choice of narrative and the use of numerical and
graphical content in order to make communications
understandable remains a significant challenge but
there seems to be agreement about the prioritisation of
issues for further discussion and research. Providing
analytical ‘clarity’ to users is more important than ana-
lytical ‘precision’ as evidenced by the respective scores
for likelihood clarity (82%) and likelihood precision
(48%). Comparable results were obtained for expres-
sions of confidence (variability due to epistemic/alea-
tory uncertainties) for which the comparable scores
were clarity (72%) and precision (53%).
There remains an unresolved debate about the use of
narratives to support numerical expressions of likelihood
and confidence as reflected in the lowest quartile rank-
ings for the use of qualitative as well as quantitative
terms for expressions of hazard ‘likelihood’ and scientific
‘confidence’. These two values produced some of the lar-
gest spreads of opinion and this is consistent with an on-
going discourse that has been joined by commentators
such as Cooke (2015) who note the near-impossibility of
devising meaningful qualitative narratives to describe
numerical probabilities.
Quality standard - proximity
Practitioners at the interface know, and already attach
significant importance to, the many factors that contrib-
ute to effective provider-centric communications. When
the value statements for ‘scientific analysis’ and ‘commu-
nication’ are ranked together, 11 out of the top 15 re-
lated to communication.
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The participants ranked highly communications “de-
livered from one source to avoid mixed scientific mes-
sages” and thereby difficulties such as those
experienced in Guadeloupe in 1976 (Fiske 1984). This
result is consistent with the generally accepted view
that authoritative scientific information and advice
should be sourced through a coordinating person or
body (Fiske 1984; Newhall and Punongbayan 1996;
Lipshitz et al. 2001; Driedger et al. 2008; NZ/MCDEM
2008; Barclay et al. 2008; Frenzen and Matarrese 2008;
OECD 2015). Doyle et al. (2015) note that this ap-
proach also facilitates the integration of the wide range
of expert opinions required to manage uncertainty dur-
ing decision-making and helps combat issues arising
from any conflicts between scientists.
Recommendations
Clearer goals for hazard assessments at the interface
The interface role of volcanologists is either changing
or, at least, is likely to change. Our literature review re-
vealed that an increasingly wide range of services is
sought from volcanologists. Consistent with this, and
based on new data presented in Table 6, we have con-
cluded that bare characterisations of the temporal,
spatial and physical parameters of volcanic hazard sce-
narios are ‘often’ accompanied by advice, and that ad-
vice ‘sometimes’ includes advice about hazard and risk
mitigation issues.
These changes are potentially significant and have fore-
seeable consequences (Weinberg 1972, 1992; Nowotny
2003; Van Nuffelen 2004). Volcanologists are exposed to
new managerial hazards and are vulnerable to managerial
risks, when they stray from their traditional roles and
practices (e.g. providing lahar hazard zone maps) into an
extended role (e.g. providing risk-related advice such as
risk alert levels based upon lahar hazard zones). The ‘ex-
posure’ comes from volcanologists extending their scien-
tific advisory roles; the ‘vulnerability’ is derived from any
lack of competence, time or resources to fulfil those ex-
tended and more complex roles (OECD 2015; Bretton et
al. 2015; Bretton and Aspinall 2017).
With a view to assessing management risk exposures
and vulnerabilities, a starting point is to define ‘scien-
tific analysis’ by reference to the relevant qualities of
the reasonably competent volcanologist engaged to
undertake monitoring and analysis. These qualities in-
clude education, training, expertise, experience, skills
and knowledge. This definition is adopted to character-
ise the usual role and thereby the usual exposures and
vulnerabilities of volcanologists. It is argued here that
caution must be exercised when scientists either volun-
teer or are required to adopt an extended role that in-
cludes making judgements that are not based upon the
‘scientific analysis’ of monitoring data, without
acquiring relevant extended competencies in advance.
The dangers of role extensions and poor communica-
tion were well illustrated by Simoncini (2014) in the
context of the L’Aquila trial.11
In our first paper, we investigated the discourse that
argues that contextualisation undertaken by scientists
must be constrained within certain boundaries. To ad-
dress an absence of guidance for managing these bound-
aries, we advocated a more structured approach based
upon open, transparent and fully articulated quality
standards of materiality, proximity, comprehensibility
and integrity. To convey the purpose of a more struc-
tured approach, we here recommend the setting of three
overriding interface goals.
Building upon the terminology of the US/NRC (1996)
and Nowotny (2003), these interface goals might be:
 To identify, articulate and preserve the essential
values and methodologies of ‘reliable’ or ‘good’
science - Getting assessments right, by preserving
‘good science’.
 To seek out the requirements of decision-makers in
a proactive iterative way so as to help ensure hazard
assessments are relevant to, and fit for, their needs
and expectations – Identifying which assessments
will have greatest validity and utility, by means
of deliberation.
 To ensure hazard analyses are not only right
(i.e. reliable or good) but also socially robust
(i.e. valid and relevant) – Getting the right
assessments, by means of informed
contextualisation.
We argue that there is neither a necessary nor an in-
surmountable conflict between these three goals if the
principles of hazard assessment at the interface are fully
articulated with an elevated level of transparency and
are continually tested as advocated by Nowotny (2003)
and the OECD (2015).
A structured, fully articulated and integrated role for
deliberation
Deliberation has a pivotal role as the precursor to, and
driver of, contextualisation.12 For deliberation to be mean-
ingful, we argue that decision-makers must:
 have an enforceable right to seek and receive such
information and training as is necessary to enable
to them participate fully and effectively, and
 be given every opportunity to identify and make
known: (a) the essential characteristics of scientific
analysis (i.e. scientific methodology) that they value;
and (b) their wider risk-related hazard assessment
requirements.
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There must also be a “structured requirement that
others listen” Grabill and Simmons (1998, 427).
Deliberation will drive not only the ‘creation’ and ‘evo-
lution’ of the negotiated quality standards required to
regulate contextualisation and enhance its utility, but
also ‘evaluations’ of those standards. In the future, delib-
eration will be a more integral part of scientific analysis
(a tail that wags the analytical dog) and not just a social
science afterthought (a wagging flexible tail grafted onto
the end of an inflexible linear process of analysis).
Although we fully accept that effective dialogue may
be very difficult to achieve in practice, the very process
of deliberation itself, which would be described by
some commentators as a process of ‘co-production’
(e.g. Scolobig et al. 2014), may contribute to: (1) a shift
of emphasis from ‘individual’ to ‘collective’ perspectives
(Doyle et al. 201513); (2) the building of trust between sci-
entists and decision-makers; and thereby (3) better risk-
mitigation outcomes (Hincks et al. 2014; Fischhoff 2013).
We are not attempting to supplement the established
discourse describing the difficulties of undertaking vol-
canic hazard assessments. Rather, we are advocating new
initiatives that encourage the trial of practical solutions for
those difficulties based on structured deliberation with
decision-makers. Four sub-questions within question 70
of our survey asked the participants to state whether,
within the volcanic settings best known to them, they saw
any evidence of a trend in recent years towards more pub-
lic participation in hazard monitoring and assessment and
risk assessment, management and mitigation. Whilst par-
ticipants recorded little public participation in providing
knowledge for hazard assessments (only 2 participants out
of 24) and making risk assessments (2/24), more participa-
tion but still very low participation was noted in respect of
hazard monitoring (5/24) and risk management including
the selection of mitigation strategies and measures (6/24).
Accordingly, deliberation may have to be given a higher
priority before it fulfils its potential within volcanic risk
governance.
More structured contextualisation
We argue that it is possible to begin to formulate some
general principles that might lead to hazard assessments
with greater utility. Fine-tuning methodologies of con-
textualisation is both unnecessary, and inappropriate for
three main reasons.
First, at a location-specific level, acceptable contextual-
isation practices should always be the product of struc-
tured deliberation involving relevant decision-makers.
Secondly, acceptable contextualisation practices will re-
flect a very wide range of geological, geographical, tech-
nical, historical, governmental (at multiple levels),
cultural, spiritual, linguistic, legal, political, economic,
time and resource drivers (management drivers) (Bretton
et al. 2015). Thirdly, scientists should consider carefully,
and have appropriate regard to, the human rights of
individuals, and the democratic and legal mandates, if
any, of civil protection authorities, to take risk deci-
sions based upon a wide range of factors (UK/GOS
2011). Individuals will have a variety of reasons for
living with volcanic risks. Scientists should accept that
a more informed understanding of volcanic hazards,
to which they will make an essential evidenced-based
contribution, will represent only part of the know-
ledge upon which difficult risk decisions will be made.
Those decisions may address risks from multiple nat-
ural and human-made hazards, and reflect “structural
constraints rooted in difficulty in accessing resources,
historical and cultural heritage and political-economy”
(Gaillard 2008, 325).14
It follows that acceptable practices (supported by evi-
dence-based regional guidance) in one volcanic region
may differ markedly from the acceptable practices in other
regions. We argue, however, that all principles, values and
methodologies that are widely recognised as critical hall-
marks of ‘good science’, should be accepted as paramount
and non-negotiable quality standards (i.e. a constant) in
every region.
Thirdly, contextualisation is inherently ‘dynamic’ be-
cause volcanic hazards and risks (and related manage-
ment drivers) emerge and change over a wide array of
time-scales ranging from minutes and hours during pe-
riods of unrest; to weeks, months or even years during
cycles of risk governance.
In Table 8, we present several general principles, firstly
for further consideration and development at a
location-specific level, and, secondly as a reasoned starting
point for future empirical research, particularly in Iceland,
South-East Asia, Latin and South America, New Zealand,
Japan and Africa. These important volcanic regions will
have multiple management drivers that may not be ad-
equately addressed by our theoretical choices and the
new, but limited, survey and interview data presented in
this paper. Any principles relating to integrity should
strive to mitigate the first eight characterisations of behav-
iour listed in Table 3.
We argue that a more structured, but carefully nuanced,
approach to contextualisation reflecting location-specific
management drivers will:
 Enhance the governance of societal risks
(i.e. promote “getting better” Bretton et al. 2015,
17–18), by giving much needed clarity to:
◦ the treacherous, increasingly problematic and
murky hazard/risk interface; and
◦ the divisive, blurred, porous and confused role of
interface volcanologists.
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Table 8 Prototype Code of Practice and guidance for volcanic hazard assessments
Prototype Code of Practice and guidance for volcanic hazard assessments
This code:
• contains practical advice on how to provide effective outcome-focused hazard assessments;
• is not intended to be either prescriptive or comprehensive; and deliberately avoids do’s and don’ts
• does not purport to have legal status but aims to assist relevant risk governance stakeholders to identify, and comply with, their legal duties; and
• can also be used as a simple, short, targeted checklist to encourage, and facilitate, deliberation between risk governance stakeholders, so that a
wide range of management drivers are openly identified and discussed. These drivers may be geological, geographical, technical, historical,
governmental (at multiple levels), cultural, spiritual, linguistic, legal, political, economic, or time/resource related.
Column 1 contains a code of general principles of acceptable practice that are supplemented and supported by evidence-based guidance in column 2.
General principles Guidance Sources
Hazard assessments
Unless alternative principles are discussed and agreed with users in advance, hazard assessments shall be:
Open and transparent Conducted in a manner that it is open, iterative,
inclusive and understandable and thereby capable
of inspiring trust in and support from end-users.
US/NRC 1996; Marzocchi et al. 2012; Hill et al. 2013;
Hincks et al. 2014; OECD 2015.
Systematic, rational and capable
of independent review/audit
Ensuring suitable and sufficient planned assessment
of all available evidence and significant issues and
adequate consideration of any matter arising from
legitimate and responsible scientific disagreement.
Scientific disagreement and resulting communication
difficulties were evident during the volcanic incidents
in Guadeloupe (1976) and St Vincent (1979).
Fiske 1984; Driedger et al. 2008, 505; Frenzen and
Matarrese 2008). See also Funtowicz and Ravetz 1992;
Laudan 1996; Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof 1999; Lupton
1999; Jasanoff 2002; Merz and Thieken 2005; Renn
2008; Mellor 2008; Johnson and Jeunemaitre 2011;
Spieghalter and Reisch 2011; Aspinall 2012; Marzocchi
et al. 2012; Aspinall and Cooke 2013; Rougier 2013;
Rougier and Beven 2013; Hicks et al. 2013; Cornell and
Jackson 2013; Freer et al. 2013; Beven et al. 2015
Based on relevant evidence and
experience and reflect structured
deliberation by experts with an
appropriate range of different and
complementary geo-scientific skills
A Bayesian evidentiary analysis approach may
provide a way to pool imprecise judgements in
the light of multiple streams of inexact data and
indistinct observations. It may also provide an
impartial quantitative basis for incorporating
imperfect volcanological insights into hazard
assessment in a coherent manner despite
deterministic insufficiency.
Stern and Fineberg 1996; Renn 2008; Aspinall 2012;
Independent Free from duress and uninfluenced by the pressures
of other interested parties such as, but not limited
to, risk decision makers, local advisers or members
of the public (social pressure), the media and/or
possible or actual litigation.
Voight 1998.
Neutral Avoiding advocating, encouraging or refuting the
point of view of an interested party or a particular
risk management response, avoiding value-laden
statements and maintaining political neutrality
and attempting to neutralise any unintended
negative bias.
Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Stern and Fineberg
1996; Newhall and Punongbayan 1996; Punongbayan
et al. 1996; Marzocchi et al. 2012.
Unbiased Dispassionately ignoring all “non-hazard”
implications (i.e. risk assessment and management
issues) that may be contingent upon the temporal,
spatial and physical parameters of the hazard
scenarios – i.e. framed “irrespective of the
consequences of the threatening event”
Barberi and Carapezza 1996; Punongbayan et al. 1996.
Value-free Unaffected by societal context e.g. knowledge of
societal exposures and vulnerabilities.
Barberi and Carapezza 1996; Punongbayan et al. 1996.
Objective No hazard assessment can be truly objective, but
the known sources of subjectivity can be stated
so that they are explicit and can be challenged
e.g. adopted assumptions, definitions, models, methods,
thresholds, parameters, monitoring choices, etc.
Stern and Fineberg 1996; Freudenburg 1988;
Bohnenblust and Slovic 1998, 159; Horlick-Jones
1998; Funtowicz and Ravetz 1990; Wynne 1992; IRGC
2005; Renn 2008; Aspinall 2012; Marzocchi and
Bebbington 2012; Marzocchi et al. 2012; Leonard
et al. 2014; Beven et al. 2015.
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Table 8 Prototype Code of Practice and guidance for volcanic hazard assessments (Continued)
Balanced Reflecting the inherent complexities of volcanic
hazards, what is known/unknown, certain/uncertain
and all material matters (such the absence of
available data) including those matters that may
detract from the final advice – to reflect the full
range of opinions and competing contrary views
and never cherry-picking.
Newhall and Punongbayan 1996; Department of
Farming and Rural Affairs DEFRA - The Central Science
Laboratory 2007; Marzocchi and Bebbington 2012;
Stein and Geller 2012; Rougier and Beven 2013, Stein
and Friedrich 2014; Beven et al. 2015; Marti 2015.
In compliance with good practice
and all relevant quality standards.
Identify the current dynamic standards of monitoring,
analysis and communication that a reasonably
competent hazard assessment would reach having
complied with all applicable standards.
A hazard assessment should retain those practice
values touching probity and quality associated with
traditional scientific methodologies.
As far as reasonably practicable,
hazard assessments shall be
suitable for the purposes for
which they are provided.
A hazard assessment is suitable if it satisfies the
reasonable needs of its foreseeable users.
Stern and Fineberg 1996; McGuire et al. 2009.
Hazard communications
Unless alternative principles are discussed and agreed with users in advance, as far as reasonably practicable hazard communications shall be:
Candid and truthful even
if worrisome
Chakraborty 2011
Material A hazard assessment should be relevant to end-users’
demands for scientific input, and sensitive to competing
demands relating to the scope, precision and timing of
that input.
Comprehensible Communicated clearly: (1) using words, numbers,
terms and graphics that are readily understandable
to end-users; (2) in a user-friendly format; and
(3) accommodating the known strengths and
weaknesses of end-user thought processes to ensure
that users can easily extract meaning.
Sorensen and Mileti 1987; Punongbayan et al. 1996;
Nature 1997; Newhall et al. 1999; Barclay et al. 2008;
Chakraborty 2011; Alemanno 2011; Doyle et al. 2014.
Timely Voight 1996; Chakraborty 2011
Recorded in a permanent format Hill et al. 2013; Aspinall and Cooke 2013.
Easily accessible (if appropriate,
delivered in a variety of formats).
Issued from one authorised
authoritative source.
Fiske 1984; Newhall and Punongbayan 1996;
Driedger et al. 2008; Frenzen and Matarrese 2008;
OECD 2015.
Hazard assessors
Hazard assessors shall:
Use their best endeavours to
command the trust and
confidence of the users of hazard
assessments; and
To nurture the willingness of end-users to receive and
trust scientific advice and make informed decisions
based upon the quality of existing relationships,
hazard assessors should ensure that: (1) they act
always with honesty, integrity, independence and
impartiality; and (2) their actions are candid,
competent, consistent, open and accountable.
Only offer hazard assessments that
they are competent, and have the
capacity and resources, to provide.
An increasingly wide range of services is sought from
volcanologists and bare characterisations of the
temporal, spatial and physical parameters of volcanic
hazard scenarios (e.g. lahar hazard zone maps) are
often accompanied by advice that sometimes
includes advice about hazard and risk mitigation
issues (e.g. volcano-wide alert levels).
Volcanologists are exposed to new managerial hazards,
and vulnerable to managerial risks, when they stray, for
whatever reason, from their traditional roles and
practices (such as providing lahar hazard zone maps)
and to provide risk-related advice (such as risk alert
levels based upon lahar hazard zones). The ‘exposure’
comes from volcanologists extending their scientific
advisory role; the ‘vulnerability’ is derived from any
Bretton et al. 2015; OECD 2015; Bretton and Aspinall 2017.
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 Enhance the governance of managerial risks
(i.e. promote “getting smarter” Bretton et al. 2015, 19),
by identifying managerial hazards at the interface, and
mitigating avoidable managerial risks:
◦ by structured delineation of the role of interface
volcanologists;
◦ by structured consideration of all necessary role
competencies (including education, training,
expertise, experience, skills and knowledge);
◦ by careful recruitment and selection to meet those
competencies
◦ by structured identification of all competency
shortfalls; and
◦ by structured mitigation of those shortfalls by the
provision of suitable and sufficient: (a) information,
education, supervision, training, coaching; and (b)
time and other resources.
All stakeholders at the interface (and not just volcanol-
ogists) should have clear roles, responsibilities, resources
and rights to guide their actions and interactions
(Simoncini 2014; UN/ISDR 2015; Bretton et al. 2015;
Scolobig 2015), and these should be driven by and re-
flect the stakeholder-negotiated contextualisation prac-
tices to which reference has already been made.
Stakeholders should also value and accept the principles
they have negotiated so that no stakeholder is tempted
or pressurised to bend or ignore them, or the legal man-
dates upon which they are based.
By arguing the merits of contextualised hazard assess-
ments, we must consider all foreseeable consequences.
Volcanologists may be exposed to new managerial haz-
ards and will be vulnerable to managerial risks if they
are not competent or lack either the time or suitable re-
sources to fulfil more extensive and complex roles. In
the absence of both careful planning and clear agreed
governance roles at the interface, changed roles may re-
sult in: (1) an unstructured blurring of the boundaries
between the physical, societal and managerial dimen-
sions of risk governance; (2) the interface challenges
and resulting behaviour detailed in Tables 2 and 3; (3)
contextualisation that is in disequilibrium and unbal-
anced, and fails to preserve traditional standards of
good science; and (4) foreseeable legal and other conse-
quences (Scolobig 2015; Bretton et al. 2015).
Quality regulation is intended to support the three
interface goals, referred to above, whilst actively miti-
gating the managerial risks posed to volcanologists by
role changes. In our first paper we referred to six pos-
sible sources of quality regulation, namely: external,
collective or self, employer, personal, expert and negoti-
ated. Our proposed quality standards can be used to
discuss and develop stakeholder-negotiated regulation
norms and, over longer periods, may influence the
other five sources of regulation. By enhancing the clar-
ity of relevant and effective quality standards and redu-
cing the unconstrained influences of stakeholders, they
are intended to produce contextualisations that are
more likely to be in equilibrium and balanced as illus-
trated in Fig. 1.
Conclusions
In the absence of relevant quality standards, the contextual-
isation of hazard assessments is likely to be methodologic-
ally diverse and determined by contingent pressures. An
unstructured approach may not lead to acceptable stan-
dards of societal risk governance, and may expose volcanol-
ogists to managerial hazards, leaving them vulnerable to
the legal and other consequences of managerial risks.
We do not advocate acceptance of this status quo but
present for consideration four reasoned quality stan-
dards (standards of materiality, proximity, comprehensi-
bility and integrity as described earlier), and some
general principles. They: (1) are framed by the theoret-
ical choices in our first paper; (2) are focussed upon this
paper’s characterisations of the existing challenges and
resulting behaviour based upon published literature; and
(3) reflect current practitioner sentiments and practices
evident in new empirical data.
We introduce the concept of the equilibrium of context-
ualisation in order to illustrate the likely effect of uncon-
strained stakeholder pressures and risk influences upon the
traditional role of volcanologists and the hallmarks of
long-established scientific methodologies. Quality standards
for contextualisation offer the possibility of hazard assess-
ments having greater validity and utility, when measured by
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lack of competencies, time or resources to fulfil those
extended roles.
A competent hazard assessor is one who has
sufficient training, expertise, experience, practical
and thinking skills, and knowledge to undertake all
their roles to a recognised standard. The level of
competence required will depend upon many issues
including, but not limited to, the nature and
complexity of the risk-mitigation decisions to be
made, the capacity and competence of the decision
makers, and the time and resources available.
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reference to the sentiments and actions of their users. They
will also mitigate the managerial risks faced by volcanolo-
gists undertaking more complex roles in the future.
Endnotes
1“Hazard communication by volcanologists: Part 1 -
Framing the case for contextualisation and related quality
standards in volcanic hazard assessments” [Bretton et al, J
Appl. Volcanol. DOI 10.1186/s13617-018-0077-x, 2018]
2The first author did not have the time or funding to
interview all 33 survey participants.
3Donovan and Oppenheimer (2014, 155) note that
“the boundaries between providing advice and being in-
volved in decision-making were murky because of the
high dependence on scientific advice”.
4Donovan and Oppenheimer (2012) note that “scien-
tific governance (Irwin 2008) and risk governance (Renn
2008) are much discussed in science and technology
studies”, and acknowledge that “the demarcation of sci-
ence, risk and politics is increasingly problematic”. They
suggest that recent works (e.g. Stirling 2007) “have dem-
onstrated that even the separation of risk assessment
and risk management may be an oversimplification”.
5Renn (2008) identifies the risk of societal values, and
political and other non-scientific choices, influencing the
findings of scientific analysis and the consequential biasing
of risk-mitigation outcomes. “Risk decisions are, ultim-
ately, public policy choices…Analysis can gather useful in-
formation about which trade-offs citizens as individuals
would prefer, but scientists cannot and should not be ex-
pected to make decisions that involve societal values. A
specialist’s role is to bring as much relevant knowledge as
possible to participants in a decision whose job is to make
the value-laden choice. Good science is a necessary – in a
fact, an indispensable – but not sufficient basis of good
risk characterisation…Risk characterisation requires a
sound scientific base, supported by systematic analysis. Of
critical importance is maintaining the integrity of the ana-
lytical process, in particular protecting it from political
and other pressures that may attempt to influence findings
or characterisation so as to bias outcomes” [emphasis
added] (Renn 2008, 158).
6Donovan and Oppenheimer (2014, 157) suggest that
“a clear definition of the science-policy interface” is re-
quired in the context of volcanic risk.
7OECD 2015, 32 note “In many countries, scientific
advisory bodies that are called upon in emergency situa-
tions are embedded into civil protection structures or
formally exist under one or several ministries or govern-
mental agencies. Independent science bodies may also
be called upon to provide scientific advice during crisis
situations. The boundaries between playing an advisory
role and direct involvement in decision-making are
not always clear for these various structures and this
can undermine any advice that is given. Although
well-established advisory systems often have a clear
definition of their role and the roles of their experts,
the advisory and decision-making responsibilities in
crisis situations can easily be confused.”
8The importance that interviewees attached to scientific
independence and freedom for value is supported by
Pierson et al. (2014) who suggest values of ‘independence’
and ‘impartiality’ enhance perceptions that scientists have
integrity and, with the further perceived qualities of
‘reliability’, ‘competence’ and ‘openness’, are trustworthy.
9One known exception is the International Association
of Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth’s Interior
(IAVCEI) Subcommittee for Crisis Protocols “Professional
conduct of scientists during volcanic crises” (Newhall et
al. 1999) which, under the heading “Exaggerated state-
ments of risk, or, conversely, overly reassuring statements
about safety of an area when significant risk exists” stated
“The best protection against unintentional exaggeration of
insufficient statements is peer review of all estimates
of danger. A crisis situation makes peer review difficult
but very important, some oral or written review is usually
possible during a team meeting or lull in the unrest
(Newhall et al. 1999, 330)”.
10“[Analysis] uses rigorous, replicable methods, evalu-
ated under the agreed protocols of an expert community
– such as those of disciplines in the natural, social, or
decision sciences, as well as mathematics, logic and the
law – to arrive at answers to factual questions. It oper-
ates on the assumption that facts can be found through
an objective, that is, dispassionate and impartial) exam-
ination of phenomena” (US/NRC 1996, 73).
11“In fact, according to [the L’Aquila verdict], the signifi-
cance of the opinion issued by the scientists in that case is
directly linked to their membership of an administrative
body charged with specific competence and tasks by the
legislation. If the scientists had exclusively expressed the
opinion as mere experts or scholars, the effects of such an
opinion would have been limited to their scientific com-
munity; but since they were involved in the regulatory
process as members of an administrative Commission,
their opinion produces some legal effects on those parties
involved in the mitigation process as both regulators and
recipients….Risk communication…played a key role in the
allocation of the criminal liability on the Major Risk
Commission’s members: it was at the heart of the estab-
lishment of a causal link between the risk assessment and
the victims’ decision of staying at home and not taking the
normal individual safety precaution against earthquakes…
”(Simoncini 2014, 148–149, 152).
12“Lack of dialogue among stakeholders undertaking
volcanic risk management hinders agreement in front of
decision-making processes” (Pardo et al. 2015, 1 citing
King et al. 2007) and increases social vulnerability.
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13For information sharing [collaboration] also has impli-
cations as it moves people from an individualistic perspec-
tive (‘my information is best’) to an acknowledgement of
the collective perspective and role (‘my information is one
piece in the big picture of response’) (Doyle et al. 2015, 23).
14Gaillard 2008, 325); see also Dibben and Chester
(1999); Kelman and Mather (2008); Gaillard (2008); United
Kingdom Government Office for Science (2011); Wilson et
al. (2012); Stone et al. (2014); Christie et al. (2015).
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